基于決策者認知水平和完全信息競爭博弈的R&D項目投資決策研究

摘要： 對物質(zhì)財富的追求并非所有決策者的基本需求,企業(yè)在對R&D項目投資時的決策行為還受到?jīng)Q策者對項目未來機會價值認知水平的影響。本研究在分析R&D項目中的實物期權(quán)特征和價值相互作用的基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建了基于決策者認知水平和完全信息競爭博弈模型,研究表明,當企業(yè)決策者認知水平一定的情況下,該企業(yè)的最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品執(zhí)行價格是其他競爭對手最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品執(zhí)行價格的線性增函數(shù);在其他競爭對手最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品執(zhí)行價格一定的情況下,隨著本企業(yè)決策者認知水平的提高,該企業(yè)的最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品執(zhí)行價格減小,反之亦然;企業(yè)可獲得的最優(yōu)效用是該企業(yè)決策者認知水平的增函數(shù),是本企業(yè)最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品執(zhí)行價格的二次函數(shù)(先增后減),也是其他競爭對手最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品執(zhí)行價格的線性函數(shù);另外,仿真結(jié)果進一步給出了各階段投資額對博弈均衡和最優(yōu)效用的具體影響機理,企業(yè)根據(jù)該機理可對各階段的投資額進行優(yōu)化。以上結(jié)論有助于企業(yè)更好地進行R&D項目投資決策。
The pursuit of wealth is not the only basic demand of all enterprises. Decision-makers' cognitive level for R&D projects' future value also influences their investment behaviors. Existing studies still have certain insufficiency. First, the stage division of R&D project has an over-simplification problem, and a few studies analyze the interaction between different stages' real options. Second, most of these studies are qualitative analysis and ignore the influence of decision-makers' bounded rationality. The reason is the complexity of interaction between different stages' real options. Decision behaviors are driven by the pursuit of wealth and decision-makers' cognitive level, management experience, intuition, and emotional emotion. According to the above statements, this study first analyzes the interaction of the characteristics between different stages' real options, then builds a complete information game model considering decision makers' cognitive level to analyze the optimal decision deeply. We combined subjective factors of R&D projects with objective factors to deliver complete research. We find the optimal execution price of a firm is linearly increasing with its competitors' optimal product execution price when decision makers' cognitive level remains constant. The firm's optimal execution price will decrease with the increase of the cognitive level of the decision-maker when its competitors' optimal product execution price remains constant and vice versa. The firm's optimal utility is an increasing function of its decision makers' cognitive level. It is also a quadratic function(first increased and then decreased) of the firm's optimal product execution price and a linear function of its competitors' optimal product execution price. Simulation results make a better understanding of the changing process of the firm's optimal product execution price under different investments in each stage. The firm's optimal product execution price first increases and then decreases with the increase of investment in each stage. The investment in the first stage has the greatest impact on the optimal product execution price when investment in each stage increases at the same rate. For optimistic decision makers, the investment in the second stage has a bigger impact on the optimal product execution price than investment in the third stage. When each stage's investment increases, the variation of all firms' optimal product execution price in the first and second stage is higher than the third stage. Also, simulation results show that investment also affects the optimal utility. Specifically, firms 'optimal utility first increased and then decreased when each stage's investment increased. The first stage's investment has the greatest influence on the optimal utility if each stage's investment increases at the same level. Firms with a higher products price, demand and cost can get a higher optimal utility in the first and second stage than the third stage when each stage's investment increases. Firms with higher potential and realistic demand can obtain a higher optimal utility. In conclusion, there exists a dynamic equilibrium relationship between the optimal product execution price, the optimal utility, the decision-makers cognitive level, and each stage's investment. To make the perfect strategy, decision-makers should consider not only the competitor's product price and strategy decision but also their cognitive level of real options value.